Bibliography


  • Calle, Sophie. 2007. Prenez Soin De Vous. Arles: Actes Sud.

  • Canguilhem, Georges. 1992. La Connaissance De La Vie. Paris: Vrin.
    Résumé : Les études réunies dans cet ouvrage datent des années 1945-50, à l'exception de la dernière. Depuis quarante ans l'auteur n'a pas ignoré les découvertes et les révolutions conceptuelles dans les sciences biologiques. Une Nouvelle connaissance de la Vie a été esquissée en 1966 dans les Etudes d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences, aussi bien que dans Le Normal et le Pathologique (2e partie : nouvelles réflexions ... ). Elle a été poursuivie, en 1977, par Idéologie et rationalité dans l'histoire des sciences de la vie. L'auteur n'a donc pas répugné à reconnaître l'archaïsme de certaines de ses premières positions et propositions. Mais il maintient que "nouvelle connaissance" n'entraîne pas, pour le philosophe, l'abandon du projet inspirateur de La Connaissance de la Vie : s'interroger sur l'étonnant opportunisme de la relation des vivants avec leur milieux, sur l'originalité de cette présence au monde qu'on nomme la vie, alors même que, selon un grand biologiste français, "on n'interroge plus la vie aujourd'hui dans les laboratoires".
    Mots-clés : Philosophy / General.

  • Cappuccio, Massimiliano L. 2021. « The Sign Of The Hand. Symbolic Practices And The Extended Mind ». Versus. Quaderni Di Studi Semiotici, 112-113 (January-February 2011), Bompiani, Milano, Pp. 33-55. (sans date). Consulté novembre9. https://www.academia.edu/9592518/The_Sign_of_the_Hand_Symbolic_Practices_and_the_Extended_Mind.
    Résumé : The Sign of the Hand. Symbolic Practices and the Extended Mind

  • Center for History and New Media,. « Zotero Quick Start Guide ». http://zotero.org/support/quick_start_guide.

  • Choplin, Hugues. 2007. L'espace De La Pensée Française Contemporaine : A Partir De Levinas Et Laruelle. Paris: L'Harmattan.


  • Christensen, Anne-Marie Søndergaard. 2020. « Løgstrup, Levinas And The Mother: Ethics, Love, And The Relationship To The Other ». The Monist 103 (1) (janvier 1): 1-15. doi:10.1093/monist/onz024. https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onz024.
    Résumé : In this article, I investigate the similarities and differences between the ways we relate to the other in ethics and in love through an engagement with the thinking of K.E. Løgstrup and Emmanuel Levinas. My point of departure will be a reading of a novel by Maja Lucas, Mother (2016), which brings out the important and complicated nature of the relation between ethics and love. My main concern, however, is to investigate how Løgstrup’s and Levinas’s different conceptions of natural love point to differences in their understanding of the ethical relationship to the other.

  • Clark, Andy. 1998. Being There: Putting Brain, Body, And World Together Again. MIT Press.
    Résumé : Brain, body, and world are united in a complex dance of circular causation and extended computational activity. In Being There, Andy Clark weaves these several threads into a pleasing whole and goes on to address foundational questions concerning the new tools and techniques needed to make sense of the emerging sciences of the embodied mind. Clark brings together ideas and techniques from robotics, neuroscience, infant psychology, and artificial intelligence. He addresses a broad range of adaptive behaviors, from cockroach locomotion to the role of linguistic artifacts in higher-level thought.
    Mots-clés : Psychology / Cognitive Psychology.

  • Clark, Andy, et Chalmers, David. 1998. « The Extended Mind ». Analysis 58 (1): 7-19. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328150.

  • Clynes, Manfred E., et Kline, Nathan S. 1960. « Cyborgs And Space ». Astronautics (septembre): 26-27, 74-76. http://www.scribd.com/doc/2962194/Cyborgs-and-Space-Clynes-Kline.
    Résumé : Cyborgs and Space
    Mots-clés : clynes, cybernetics, kline, Uncategorizable-Uncategorizable.

  • Cohen-Levinas, Danielle. 2006. La Voix Au-Delà Du Chant : Une Fenêtre Aux Ombres. Nouvelle éd. recomposée et augmentée. Paris: Librairie Philosophique Vrin.
  • Colombetti, Giovanna. 2017. « Enactive Affectivity, Extended ». Topoi 36 (3): 445–455.

  • Colombetti, Giovanna. 2014. The Feeling Body – Affective Science Meets The Enactive Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

  • DeLancey, Craig. 2014. « Review Of <i>the Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets The Enactive Mind</i> » (septembre 16). https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/he-feeling-body-affective-science-meets-the-enactive-mind/.
  • Colombetti, Giovanna, et Torrance, Steve. 2009. « Emotion And Ethics: An Inter-(En)Active Approach ». Phenomenology And The Cognitive Sciences 8 (4): 505–526.

  • Couchot, Edmond, et Hillaire, Norbert. 2005. L'art Numérique. Paris: Flammarion.

  • Cros, Charles. 2006. Le Caillou Mort D'amour. Toulouse: Ombres.
  • Cros, Charles. 1908. Le Collier De Griffes. Paris: Stock.


  • Cuffari, Elena Clare, Di Paolo, Ezequiel, et De Jaegher, Hanne. 2015. « From Participatory Sense-Making To Language: There And Back Again ». Phenomenology And The Cognitive Sciences 14 (4) (décembre 1): 1089-1125. doi:10.1007/s11097-014-9404-9. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9404-9.
    Résumé : The enactive approach to cognition distinctively emphasizes autonomy, adaptivity, agency, meaning, experience, and interaction. Taken together, these principles can provide the new sciences of language with a comprehensive philosophical framework: languaging as adaptive social sense-making. This is a refinement and advancement on Maturana’s idea of languaging as a manner of living. Overcoming limitations in Maturana’s initial formulation of languaging is one of three motivations for this paper. Another is to give a response to skeptics who challenge enactivism to connect “lower-level” sense-making with “higher-order” sophisticated moves like those commonly ascribed to language. Our primary goal is to contribute a positive story developed from the enactive account of social cognition, participatory sense-making. This concept is put into play in two different philosophical models, which respectively chronicle the logical and ontogenetic development of languaging as a particular form of social agency. Languaging emerges from the interplay of coordination and exploration inherent in the primordial tensions of participatory sense-making between individual and interactive norms; it is a practice that transcends the self-other boundary and enables agents to regulate self and other as well as interaction couplings. Linguistic sense-makers are those who negotiate interactive and internalized ways of meta-regulating the moment-to-moment activities of living and cognizing. Sense-makers in enlanguaged environments incorporate sensitivities, roles, and powers into their unique yet intelligible linguistic bodies. We dissolve the problematic dichotomies of high/low, online/offline, and linguistic/nonlinguistic cognition, and we provide new boundary criteria for specifying languaging as a prevalent kind of human social sense-making.


  • De Jaegher, Hanne, et Di Paolo, Ezequiel. 2007. « Participatory Sense-Making ». Phenomenology And The Cognitive Sciences 6 (4) (décembre 1): 485-507. doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9.
    Résumé : As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition as that of how meaning is generated and transformed in the interplay between the unfolding interaction process and the individuals engaged in it. The notion of sense-making in this realm becomes participatory sense-making. The onus of social understanding thus moves away from strictly the individual only.
  • de Vries, Hent. 2001. « Of Miracles And Special Effects ». International Journal For The Philosophy Of Religion 50 (1-3) (décembre): 41-56.

  • Declerck, Gunnar. 2018. « Absent Aspects, Possible Perceptions And Open Intersubjectivity: A Critical Analysis Of Dan Zahavi’S Account Of Horizontal Intentionality ». Journal Of The British Society For Phenomenology (avril 16): 1-21. doi:10.1080/00071773.2018.1463638.
    Résumé : The aim of this narrow-focused text is to argue against the claim that the appresentation of unperceived features of objects that is implied in perceptual intentionality presupposes a reference to perceptions other subjects could have of these objects. This claim, as it has been defended by Dan Zahavi, rests upon an erroneous supposition about the modal status of the perceptual possibilities to which the perceived object refers, which shall not be interpreted as effectively realizable but as mere de jure possibilities, perceptions that could have been realized in principle, but that are maybe beyond one’s reach considering one’s concrete factual powers and opportunities. Horizontal intentionality is better accounted for in terms of perceptions that one could have had because of one’s embodied character and the always open possibility of occupying another position with respect to the object. This modal ubiquity which is inherent to one’s being-in-space is what supports the field of de jure possibilities that is implied in horizontal intentionality. The co-presence of the parts and features one does not perceive from here is a counterpoint to one’s being-possibly-there. -------------------------------------------------------- Get a free e-print at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/RCVMBkbAuxWT8G28NMI8/full
    Pièce jointe Full Text PDF 258.1 ko (source)


  • Declerck, Gunnar, et Lenay, Charles. 2018. « Living In Space. A Phenomenological Account ». Dans Mobility Of Visually Impaired People: Fundamentals And Ict Assistive Technologies, éd. Edwige Pissaloux et Ramiro Velazquez, 3-52. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54446-5_1.
    Résumé : The aim of this chapter is to highlight the main phenomenological features of lived space , that is, space as it is experienced by the subject through various intentional modes , first of all perception, but also non-perceptual modes, such as trying to remember where something is or how a room is arranged, or thinking about the way to go from A to B (itinerary planning). A general overview of the most important phenomenological accounts made in the literature is proposed, with a focus on the following topics: the relation between bodily skills, and more generally motricity (i.e. the capacity to move), and lived space; the impact of one’s body materiality on one’s experience of space: how possessing a physical body with material properties such as impenetrability and heaviness affects one’s experience of space; the role of the anticipation of possibilities in the enacting and organization of lived space; the role of sociality and the impact of one’s body ‘visibility’, i.e. the fact that one can be perceived by others, in one’s experience of space. The objective of this overview in the context of this book is to get a better understanding of the experience of space in visually impaired people. Based on this phenomenological account, this chapter will, as a result, offer a series of reflections about the peculiarities of the space blind people live in.
    Mots-clés : Action, Counterfactuals, Embodiment, Heidegger, Husserl, Phenomenology, Space perception, Spatial cognition in blind persons, Visual impairment.


  • Dekoninck, Ralph. 2012. « Peinture Des Vanités Ou Peinture Vaniteuse ? L’Invention De La Nature Morte Chez Pieter Aertsen ». Études Épistémè. Revue De Littérature Et De Civilisation (Xvie – Xviiie Siècles) (22) (septembre 1). doi:10.4000/episteme.363. http://journals.openedition.org/episteme/363.
    Résumé : A partir de l’œuvre du peintre anversois Pieter Aertsen, souvent présenté comme l’artiste ayant contribué à l’autonomisation de la nature morte au milieu du XVIe siècle, il s’agit d’explorer les frontières mobiles et indécises entre nature morte et vanité, deux genres iconographiques envisagés sous l’angle de leur création comme de leur réception et dans la tension entre éthique et esthétique qui les caractérise. Au-delà des débats sans fin sur les intentions précise de l’artiste balançant entre critique morale et pure délectation, nous cherchons à mettre en évidence la manière dont ses tableaux spiritualisent le réel non pas en vue de le condamner ni de l’exalter, mais pour déplacer l’attention sur son rendu pictural apprécié tant par l’esprit que par les sens, ce qui fait de son œuvre un jalon important dans l’émergence non seulement d’un genre pictural mais plus encore d’un rapport esthétique à l’œuvre d’art.


  • DeRosa, Darleen M., Hantula, Donald A., Kock, Ned, et D'Arcy, John. 2004. « Trust And Leadership In Virtual Teamwork: A Media Naturalness Perspective ». Human Resource Management 43 (2-3) (juin 1): 219-232. doi:10.1002/hrm.20016. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/hrm.20016/abstract.
    Résumé : Paradoxically, virtual teams are ubiquitous and often successful, contrary to most current communication theories'predictions. Media naturalness theory (Kock, 2001), an evolutionary perspective on communication and its principles of media naturalness, innate schema similarity, and learned schema diversity can be used to understand, study, and manage successful virtual teamwork. In particular, potential problems of trust and leadership in virtual teams are shown to be amenable to solutions rooted explicitly in an evolutionary context. From a media naturalness perspective, geographic distance and technological complexity are secondary to processes of adaptation, as humans remain the most complex and flexible part of the communication system. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
    Pièce jointe Full Text PDF 126.1 ko (source)

  • Derrida, Jacques. 2009. La Voix Et Le Phénomène. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

  • Derrida, Jacques. 2006. L'animal Que Donc Je Suis. Paris: Galilée.

  • Derrida, Jacques. 1999. La Carte Postale : De Socrate À Freud Et Au-Delà. Paris: Flammarion.

  • Derrida, Jacques. 1993. La Dissémination. Paris: Seuil.

  • Derrida, Jacques. 1991. Donner Le Temps. Paris: Galilée.

  • Derrida, Jacques. 1979. L'écriture Et La Différence. Paris: Seuil.

  • Derrida, Jacques. 1967. De La Grammatologie. Paris: Editions de Minuit.

  • Derrida, Jacques, et Hantai, Simon. 1998. Le Toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy. Paris: Galilée.

  • Derrida, Jacques, et Lawlor, Leonard. 2011. Voice And Phenomenon: Introduction To The Problem Of The Sign In Husserl's Phenomenology. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

  • Derrida, Jacques, et Leavey, John P. 1989. Edmund Husserl's Origin Of Geometry, An Introduction. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

  • Descartes, René. 2000. Discours De La Méthode. Paris: Flammarion.
  • Descartes, René, et Forge, Louys De la. 1664. L'homme Et Un Traité De La Formation Du Foetus. Charles Angot.


  • Di Paolo, Ezequiel A., et De Jaegher, Hanne. 2015. « Toward An Embodied Science Of Intersubjectivity: Widening The Scope Of Social Understanding Research ». Frontiers In Psychology 6. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00234. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00234/full.
    Résumé : Toward an embodied science of intersubjectivity: widening the scope of social understanding research
    Mots-clés : embodiment, enaction, intersubjectivity, methodology, social interaction.
    Pièce jointe Full Text PDF 287.7 ko (source)

  • Egbert, Matthew D., Barandiaran, Xabier E., et Di Paolo, Ezequiel A. 2010. « A Minimal Model Of Metabolism-Based Chemotaxis ». Plos Computational Biology 6 (12) (décembre 2): e1001004. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001004.
    Résumé : Since the pioneering work by Julius Adler in the 1960's, bacterial chemotaxis has been predominantly studied as metabolism-independent. All available simulation models of bacterial chemotaxis endorse this assumption. Recent studies have shown, however, that many metabolism-dependent chemotactic patterns occur in bacteria. We hereby present the simplest artificial protocell model capable of performing metabolism-based chemotaxis. The model serves as a proof of concept to show how even the simplest metabolism can sustain chemotactic patterns of varying sophistication. It also reproduces a set of phenomena that have recently attracted attention on bacterial chemotaxis and provides insights about alternative mechanisms that could instantiate them. We conclude that relaxing the metabolism-independent assumption provides important theoretical advances, forces us to rethink some established pre-conceptions and may help us better understand unexplored and poorly understood aspects of bacterial chemotaxis.
    Mots-clés : Bacterial Physiological Phenomena, Chemotaxis, Escherichia coli, Flagella, Fumarates, Metabolism, Models, Biological, Salmonella typhimurium, Systems Biology.
    Pièce jointe Full Text 1.3 Mo (source)

  • Ferraris, Maurizio. 2006. T'es Où ? : Ontologie Du Téléphone Mobile. Paris: Albin Michel.

  • Flichy, Patrice. 2004. Une Histoire De La Communication Moderne : Espace Public Et Vie Privée. Paris: La Découverte.


  • Floridi, Luciano, et Sanders, J.W. 2004. « On The Morality Of Artificial Agents ». Minds And Machines 14 (3) (août 1): 349-379. doi:10.1023/B:MIND.0000035461.63578.9d. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:MIND.0000035461.63578.9d.
    Résumé : Artificial agents (AAs), particularly but not only those in Cyberspace, extend the class of entities that can be involved in moral situations. For they can be conceived of as moral patients (as entities that can be acted upon for good or evil) and also as moral agents (as entities that can perform actions, again for good or evil). In this paper, we clarify the concept of agent and go on to separate the concerns of morality and responsibility of agents (most interestingly for us, of AAs). We conclude that there is substantial and important scope, particularly in Computer Ethics, for the concept of moral agent not necessarily exhibiting free will, mental states or responsibility. This complements the more traditional approach, common at least since Montaigne and Descartes, which considers whether or not (artificial) agents have mental states, feelings, emotions and so on. By focussing directly on ‘mind-less morality’ we are able to avoid that question and also many of the concerns of Artificial Intelligence. A vital component in our approach is the ‘Method of Abstraction’ for analysing the level of abstraction (LoA) at which an agent is considered to act. The LoA is determined by the way in which one chooses to describe, analyse and discuss a system and its context. The ‘Method of Abstraction’ is explained in terms of an ‘interface’ or set of features or observables at a given ‘LoA’. Agenthood, and in particular moral agenthood, depends on a LoA. Our guidelines for agenthood are: interactivity (response to stimulus by change of state), autonomy (ability to change state without stimulus) and adaptability (ability to change the ‘transition rules’ by which state is changed) at a given LoA. Morality may be thought of as a ‘threshold’ defined on the observables in the interface determining the LoA under consideration. An agent is morally good if its actions all respect that threshold; and it is morally evil if some action violates it. That view is particularly informative when the agent constitutes a software or digital system, and the observables are numerical. Finally we review the consequences for Computer Ethics of our approach. In conclusion, this approach facilitates the discussion of the morality of agents not only in Cyberspace but also in the biosphere, where animals can be considered moral agents without their having to display free will, emotions or mental states, and in social contexts, where systems like organizations can play the role of moral agents. The primary ‘cost’ of this facility is the extension of the class of agents and moral agents to embrace AAs.
    Mots-clés : artificial agents, computer ethics, levels of abstraction, moral responsibility.


  • Fourmentraux, Jean-Paul. 2011. 24. Le Comédien Virtuel. Une Redéfinition Des Frontières De L'activité Artistique. La Découverte. https://www.cairn.info/humains-non-humains--9782707165190-page-292.htm.

  • Franck, Didier. 1981. Chair Et Corps. Paris: Editions de Minuit.


  • Froese, Tom. 2017. « Life Is Precious Because It Is Precarious: Individuality, Mortality And The Problem Of Meaning ». Dans Representation And Reality In Humans, Other Living Organisms And Intelligent Machines, 33-50. Studies In Applied Philosophy, Epistemology And Rational Ethics. Springer, Cham. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-43784-2_3.
    Résumé : Computationalism aspires to provide a comprehensive theory of life and mind. It fails in this task because it lacks the conceptual tools to address the problem of meaning. I argue that a meaningful perspective is enacted by an individual with a potential that is intrinsic to biological existence: death. Life matters to such an individual because it must constantly create the conditions of its own existence, which is unique and irreplaceable. For that individual to actively adapt, rather than to passively disintegrate, expresses a value inherent in its way of life, which is the ultimate source of more refined forms of normativity. This response to the problem of meaning will not satisfy those searching for a functionalist or logical solution, but on this view such a solution will not be forthcoming. As an intuition pump for this alternative perspective I introduce two ancient foreign worldviews that assign a constitutive role to death. Then I trace the emergence of a similar conception of mortality from the cybernetics era to the ongoing development of enactive cognitive science. Finally, I analyze why orthodox computationalism has failed to grasp the role of mortality in this constitutive way.

  • Froese, Tom. 2018. Life Is Precious Because It Is Precarious: Individuality, Mortality, And The Problem Of Meaning. Consulté juillet24. http://www.academia.edu/31680898/Life_is_precious_because_it_is_precarious_Individuality_mortality_and_the_problem_of_meaning.
    Résumé : Computationalism aspires to provide a comprehensive theory of life and mind. It fails in this task because it lacks the conceptual tools to address the problem of meaning. I argue that a meaningful perspective is enacted by an individual with a

  • Froese, Tom, et Di Paolo, Ezequiel. 2009. « Sociality And The Life–Mind Continuity Thesis ». Phenomenology And The Cognitive Sciences 8 (décembre 1): 439-463. doi:10.1007/s11097-009-9140-8.
    Résumé : The life–mind continuity thesis holds that mind is prefigured in life and that mind belongs to life. The biggest challenge faced by proponents of this thesis is to show how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biological processes can be systematically extended to incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition. We suggest that this apparent ‘cognitive gap’ between minimal and human forms of life appears insurmountable largely because of the methodological individualism that is prevalent in cognitive science. Accordingly, a twofold strategy is used to show how a consideration of sociality can address both sides of the cognitive gap: (1) it is argued from a systemic perspective that inter-agent interactions can extend the behavioral domain of even the simplest agents and (2) it is argued from a phenomenological perspective that the cognitive attitude characteristic of adult human beings is essentially intersubjectively constituted, in particular with respect to the possibility of perceiving objects as detached from our own immediate concerns. These two complementary considerations of the constitutive role of inter-agent interactions for mind and cognition indicate that sociality is an indispensable element of the life–mind continuity thesis and of cognitive science more generally.
    Pièce jointe Full Text PDF 231 ko (source)


  • Froese, Tom, et Di Paolo, Ezequiel A. 2010. « Modelling Social Interaction As Perceptual Crossing: An Investigation Into The Dynamics Of The Interaction Process ». Connection Science 22 (1): 43-68. doi:10.1080/09540090903197928. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09540090903197928.
    Résumé : This paper continues efforts to establish a mutually informative dialogue between psychology and evolutionary robotics in order to investigate the dynamics of social interaction. We replicate a recent simulation model of a minimalist experiment in perceptual crossing and confirm the results with significantly simpler artificial agents. A series of psycho-physical tests of their behaviour informs a hypothetical circuit model of their internal operation. However, a detailed study of the actual internal dynamics reveals this circuit model to be unfounded, thereby offering a tale of caution for those hypothesising about sub-personal processes in terms of behavioural observations. In particular, it is shown that the behaviour of the agents largely emerges out of the interaction process itself rather than being an individual achievement alone. We also extend the original simulation model in two novel directions in order to test further the extent to which perceptual crossing between agents can self-organise in a robust manner. These modelling results suggest new hypotheses that can become the basis for further psychological experiments.

  • Froese, Tom, et Di Paolo, Ezequiel A. 2011. « The Enactive Approach ». Pragmatics & Cognition 19 (1) (juillet 26): 1-36. doi:10.1075/pc.19.1.01fro.
    Résumé : There is a small but growing community of researchers spanning a spectrum of disciplines which are united in rejecting the still dominant computationalist paradigm in favor of the enactive approach. The framework of this approach is centered on a core set of ideas, such as autonomy, sense-making, emergence, embodiment, and experience. These concepts are finding novel applications in a diverse range of areas. One hot topic has been the establishment of an enactive approach to social interaction. The main purpose of this paper is to serve as an advanced entry point into these recent developments. It accomplishes this task in a twofold manner: (i) it provides a succinct synthesis of the most important core ideas and arguments in the theoretical framework of the enactive approach, and (ii) it uses this synthesis to refine the current enactive approach to social interaction. A new operational definition of social interaction is proposed which not only emphasizes the cognitive agency of the individuals and the irreducibility of the interaction process itself, but also the need for jointly co-regulated action. It is suggested that this revised conception of ‘socio-cognitive interaction’ may provide the necessary middle ground from which to understand the confluence of biological and cultural values in personal action.
    Mots-clés : adaptivity, autonomy, cognition, enaction, sense-making, social interaction.

  • Froese, Tom, et Di Paolo, Ezequiel A. 2011. « The Enactive Approach: Theoretical Sketches From Cell To Society ». Pragmatics & Cognition 19 (1): 1-36. doi:10.1075/pc.19.1.01fro.
    Résumé : There is a small but growing community of researchers spanning a spectrum of disciplines which are united in rejecting the still dominant computational-ist paradigm in favor of the enactive approach. The framework of this approach is centered on a core set of ideas, such as autonomy, sense-making, emergence, embodiment, and experience. These concepts are finding novel applications in a diverse range of areas. One hot topic has been the establishment of an enactive approach to social interaction. The main purpose of this paper is to serve as an advanced entry point into these recent developments. It accomplishes this task in a twofold manner: (i) it provides a succinct synthesis of the most important core ideas and arguments in the theoretical framework of the enactive approach, and (ii) it uses this synthesis to refine the current enactive approach to social interaction. A new operational definition of social interaction is proposed which not only emphasizes the cognitive agency of the individuals and the irreducibility of the interaction process itself, but also the need for jointly co-regulated action. It is suggested that this revised conception of ‘socio-cognitive interaction’ may provide the necessary middle ground from which to understand the confluence of biological and cultural values in personal action. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
    Mots-clés : Culture (Anthropological), Social Interaction, Society, Values.
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  • Froese, Tom, et González-Grandón, Ximena. 2020. « How Passive Is Passive Listening? Toward A Sensorimotor Theory Of Auditory Perception ». Phenomenology And The Cognitive Sciences 19 (4) (septembre 1): 619-651. doi:10.1007/s11097-019-09641-6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-019-09641-6.
    Résumé : According to sensorimotor theory perceiving is a bodily skill involving exercise of an implicit know-how of the systematic ways that sensations change as a result of potential movements, that is, of sensorimotor contingencies. The theory has been most successfully applied to vision and touch, while perceptual modalities that rely less on overt exploration of the environment have not received as much attention. In addition, most research has focused on philosophically grounding the theory and on psychologically elucidating sensorimotor laws, but the theory’s ramifications for neuroscience still remain underexamined. Here we sketch the beginnings of a research program that could address these two outstanding challenges in terms of auditory perception. We review the neuroscience literature on passive listening, which is defined as listening without overt bodily movement, and conclude that sensorimotor theory provides a unique perspective on the consistent finding of motor system activation. In contrast to competing theories, this activation is predicted to be involved not only in the perception of speech- and action-related sounds, but in auditory perception in general. More specifically, we propose that the auditory processing associated with supplementary motor areas forms part of the neural basis of the exercise of sensorimotor know-how: these areas’ recognized role in (1) facilitating spontaneous motor responses to sound and (2) supporting flexible engagement of sensorimotor processes to guide auditory experience and enable auditory imagery, can be understood in terms of two key characteristics of sensorimotor interaction, its (1) “alerting capacity” (or “grabbiness”) and (2) “corporality” (or “bodiliness”), respectively. We also highlight that there is more to the inside of the body than the brain: there is an opportunity to develop sensorimotor theory into new directions in terms of the still poorly understood active processes of the peripheral auditory system.

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