Bibliography


  • Sebbah, François-David. 2006. “Visage De Clone”. Les Études Philosophiques (78) (September 1): 353-366. http://www.cairn.info/revue-les-etudes-philosophiques-2006-3-p-353.htm.

  • Sebbah, François-David. 2010. Qu'est-Ce Que La Technoscience ? : Une Thèse Épistémologique Ou La Fille Du Diable ?. À Présent. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

  • Sebbah, François-David. 2009. Lévinas Et Le Contemporain : Les Préoccupations De L'heure. Besançon: Solitaires Intempestifs.

  • Sebbah, François-David. 2001. L'epreuve De La Limite : Derrida, Henry, Levinas Et La Phénoménologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
  • Sebbah, François-David. 2004. “L'usage De La Phénoménologie Dans Le Paradigme De L'enaction”. Intellectica 2 (39): 169-188.

  • Sebbah, François-David. 2006. “Visage De Clone”. Les Études Philosophiques n° 78 (3): 353-366. doi:10.3917/leph.063.0353.
  • SEBBAH, François-David. “L'usage De La Méthode Phénoménologique Dans Le Paradigme De L'enaction” (no date): 20.
    Abstract: Using the method of phenomenological reduction in the paradigm of enaction. This article examines the way in which Varela employs the method of phenomenological reduction in cognitive science, and proposes an evaluation. Particular attention is paid to the question of the epokhe or phenomenological reduction, and the requirement of “mutual constraints” between “weak naturalization” and phenomenology which underlies the project of “neurophenomenology”. This critical examination leads to the hypothesis that, in spite of the rigour of Varela’s approach, there is a point at which the phenomenological posture and the work of scientific naturalization are finally mutually exclusive – this of course does not mean that the style of collaboration which is sketched out cannot be fruitful.

  • Sebbah, François-David. 2012. Testing The Limit: Derrida, Henry, Levinas, And The Phenomenological Tradition. 1 editionst ed. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
    Abstract: In exploring the nature of excess relative to a phenomenology of the limit, Testing the Limit claims that phenomenology itself is an exploration of excess. What does it mean that "the self" is "given"? Should we see it as originary; or rather, in what way is the self engendered from textual practices that transgress―or hover around and therefore within―the threshold of phenomenologial discourse? This is the first book to include Michel Henry in a triangulation with Derrida and Levinas and the first to critique Levinas on the basis of his interpolation of philosophy and religion. Sebbah claims that the textual origins of phenomenology determine, in their temporal rhythms, the nature of the subjectivation on which they focus. He situates these considerations within the broader picture of the state of contemporary French phenomenology (chiefly the legacy of Merleau-Ponty), in order to show that these three thinkers share a certain "family resemblance," the identification of which reveals something about the traces of other phenomenological families. It is by testing the limit within the context of traditional phenomenological concerns about the appearance of subjectivity and ipseity that Derrida, Henry, and Levinas radically reconsider phenomenology and that French phenomenology assumes its present form.
  • Simondon, Gilbert. 1989. Du Mode D'existence Des Objets Techniques. Paris: Aubier.

  • Simondon, Gilbert. 2007. L'individuation Psychique Et Collective. Aubier.
  • Smuts, Barbara. 2001. “Encounters With Animal Minds”. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7): 5–7.

  • Spencer-Brown, George. 2015. Laws Of Form. Leipzig: Bohmeier.


  • Srivastava, Kalpana, Das, R. C., and Chaudhury, S. 2014. “Virtual Reality Applications In Mental Health: Challenges And Perspectives”. Industrial Psychiatry Journal 23 (2): 83-85. doi:10.4103/0972-6748.151666. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4361984/.

  • Steiner, Pierre. 2010. “Philosophie, Technologie Et Cognition. Etats Des Lieux Et Perspectives”. Intellectica 2010/1-2 (53-54): 7-40. http://www.intellectica.org/SiteArchives/actuels/n53_54/1-5354-Intro_PS.pdf.
  • Steiner, Pierre, and Stewart, John. 2009. “From Autonomy To Heteronomy (And Back): The Enaction Of Social Life”. Phenomenology And The Cognitive Sciences 8 (4): 527–550.

  • Rohde, Marieke, Jaegher, Hanne De, Barbaras, Renaud, Sheya, Adam, Smith, Linda B., Colombetti, Giovanna, Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine, et al. 2014. Enaction: Toward A New Paradigm For Cognitive Science. Eds. John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo. Reprint edition. Cambridge, Mass.: A Bradford Book.
    Abstract: A comprehensive presentation of an approach that proposes a new account of cognition at levels from the cellular to the social.This book presents the framework for a new, comprehensive approach to cognitive science. The proposed paradigm, enaction, offers an alternative to cognitive science's classical, first-generation Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Enaction, first articulated by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in The Embodied Mind (MIT Press, 1991), breaks from CTM's formalisms of information processing and symbolic representations to view cognition as grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment. A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its embodied action in the world constitutes its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. Enaction offers a range of perspectives on this exciting new approach to embodied cognitive science.Some chapters offer manifestos for the enaction paradigm; others address specific areas of research, including artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, neuroscience, language, phenomenology, and culture and cognition. Three themes emerge as testimony to the originality and specificity of enaction as a paradigm: the relation between first-person lived experience and third-person natural science; the ambition to provide an encompassing framework applicable at levels from the cell to society; and the difficulties of reflexivity. Taken together, the chapters offer nothing less than the framework for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science.ContributorsRenaud Barbaras, Didier Bottineau, Giovanna Colombetti, Diego Cosmelli, Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo. Andreas K. Engel, Olivier Gapenne, Véronique Havelange, Edwin Hutchins, Michel Le Van Quyen, Rafael E. Núñez, Marieke Rohde, Benny Shanon, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Adam Sheya, Linda B. Smith, John Stewart, Evan Thompson

  • Stiegler, Bernard. 2003. Aimer, S'aimer, Nous Aimer : Du 11 Septembre Au 21 Avril. Paris: Editions Galilée.
    Abstract: La violence et l'insécurité dans lesquelles nous vivons - aussi exploitées qu'elles puissent être fantasmatiquement, voire manipulées de manière délibérée - relèvent avant tout d'une question de narcissisme, et sont le fait d'un processus de perte d'individuation. Il s'agit de narcissisme au sens où un homme comme Richard Durn, assassin d'un nous - assassiner un conseil municipal, représentation officielle d'un nous, c'est assassiner un nous - souffrait terriblement de ne pas exister, de ne pas avoir, disait-il, le " sentiment d'exister " : lorsqu'il tentait de se voir dans une glace, il n rencontrait qu'un immense néant. C'est ce qu'a révélé la publication d son journal intime par Le Monde. Durn y affirme qu'il a besoin de " faire du mal pour, au moins une fois dans [sa] vie, avoir le sentiment d'exister "Richard Durn souffre d'une privation structurelle de ses capacités narcissiques primordiales. J'appelle " narcissisme primordial " cette structure de la psychè qui est indispensable à son fonctionnement, cette part d'amour de soi qui peut devenir parfois pathologique, mais sans laquelle aucune capacité d'amour quelle qu'elle soit ne serait possible. Freud parle de narcissisme primaire, mais cette expression ne correspond pas tout à fait à ce dont je parle : elle désigne l'amour de soi infantile, une époque précoce de la sexualité. Freud parle aussi de narcissisme secondaire, ce qui survient à l'âge adulte, mais il ne s'agit encore pas de ce que je nomme le narcissisme primordial, qui est sans doute plus proche de ce que Lacan désigne dans son analyse du " stade du miroir "Il y a un narcissisme primordial aussi bien du je que du nous : pour que le narcissisme de mon je puisse fonctionner, il faut qu'il puisse se projeter dans le narcissisme d'un nous. Richard Durn, n'arrivant pas à élaborer son narcissisme, voyait dans le conseil municipal la réalité d'une altérité qui le faisait souffrir, qui ne lui renvoyait aucune image, et il l'a massacrée

  • Stiegler, Bernard. 2009. Pour Une Nouvelle Critique De L'économie Politique. Paris: Galilée.

  • Stiegler, Bernard. 2004. Philosopher Par Accident : Entretiens Avec Elie During. Paris: Galilée.

  • Stiegler, Bernard. 2001. La Technique Et Le Temps, 3 : Le Temps Du Cinéma Et La Question Du Mal-Être. Paris: Galilée.

  • Stiegler, Bernard. 1998. La Technique Et Le Temps, 2 : La Désorientation. Vol. tome 2. 3 vol. Paris: Galilée.

  • Stiegler, Bernard. 1994. La Technique Et Le Temps, 1 : La Faute D'epiméthée. Vol. tome 1. 3 vol. Paris: Galilée.


  • Thibaud, Jean-Paul. 2012. “Petite Archéologie De La Notion D'ambiance”. Communications 90 (1): 155-174. doi:10.3406/comm.2012.2659. https://www.persee.fr/doc/comm_0588-8018_2012_num_90_1_2659.
    Abstract: À l'heure où le domaine des sens entre en force dans la pensée des sciences humaines et sociales, la notion d'ambiance fait figure de proue et prend véritablement toute son ampleur. Paradoxalement, tandis que nombre de recherches se réclament explicitement de la thématique des ambiances, peu de travaux ont été menés jusqu'alors pour identifier ses sources premières et ses racines profondes. Cet article présente trois perspectives au fondement même de la notion d'ambiance : la sémantique historique, la psychopathologie existentielle et l'esthétique phénoménologique. L'objectif est de mettre en évidence ses enjeux et le potentiel heuristique qu'elle recèle. Il est montré comment l'ambiance permet d'ancrer le monde des sens au coeur de l'expérience humaine et de l'habiter.

  • Thompson, Evan. 2007. Mind In Life: Biology, Phenomenology, And The Sciences Of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    Abstract: How is life related to the mind? The question has long confounded philosophers and scientists, and it is this so-called explanatory gap between biological life and consciousness that Evan Thompson explores in Mind in Life.Thompson draws upon sources as diverse as molecular biology, evolutionary theory, artificial life, complex systems theory, neuroscience, psychology, Continental Phenomenology, and analytic philosophy to argue that mind and life are more continuous than has previously been accepted, and that current explanations do not adequately address the myriad facets of the biology and phenomenology of mind. Where there is life, Thompson argues, there is mind: life and mind share common principles of self-organization, and the self-organizing features of mind are an enriched version of the self-organizing features of life. Rather than trying to close the explanatory gap, Thompson marshals philosophical and scientific analyses to bring unprecedented insight to the nature of life and consciousness. This synthesis of phenomenology and biology helps make Mind in Life a vital and long-awaited addition to his landmark volume The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (coauthored with Eleanor Rosch and Francisco Varela). Endlessly interesting and accessible, Mind in Life is a groundbreaking addition to the fields of the theory of the mind, life science, and phenomenology.


  • Thompson, Evan. 2005. “Sensorimotor Subjectivity And The Enactive Approach To Experience”. Phenomenology And The Cognitive Sciences 4 (4) (December 1): 407-427. doi:10.1007/s11097-005-9003-x. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9003-x.
    Abstract: The enactive approach offers a distinctive view of how mental life relates to bodily activity at three levels: bodily self-regulation, sensorimotor coupling, and intersubjective interaction. This paper concentrates on the second level of sensorimotor coupling. An account is given of how the subjectively lived body and the living body of the organism are related (the body-body problem) via dynamic sensorimotor activity, and it is shown how this account helps to bridge the explanatory gap between consciousness and the brain. Arguments by O'Regan, Noë, and Myin that seek to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness in terms of ‘bodiliness’ and ‘grabbiness’ are considered. It is suggested that their account does not pay sufficient attention to two other key aspects of perceptual phenomenality: the autonomous nature of the experiencing self or agent, and the pre-reflective nature of bodily self-consciousness.
    Tags: Body Schema, Intentional Object, Perceptual Experience, Phenomenal Character, Phenomenal Consciousness.


  • Thompson, Evan, and Stapleton, Mog. 2009. “Making Sense Of Sense-Making: Reflections On Enactive And Extended Mind Theories”. Topoi 28 (1) (March 1): 23-30. doi:10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2.
    Abstract: This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.

  • Twining, Peter. 2009. “Exploring The Educational Potential Of Virtual Worlds — Some Reflections From The Schome Park Programme”. British Journal Of Educational Technology 40 (3): 496-514. http://oro.open.ac.uk/15801/.
    Abstract: This paper describes and reflects on the development of the Schome Park Programme (SPP), which was established with the specific aim of extending our thinking about schome, which aims to be the optimal educational system for the 21st century. In an earlier stage of the Schome Initiative, it became clear that people find it almost impossible to break free from established conceptions of education. Open virtual worlds like Second Life® virtual world offer opportunities for people to have radically different ‘lived experiences’ of educational systems and thus seemed to be the ideal vehicle for exploring alternative models of education. The SPP therefore set out in late 2006 to use Teen Second Life® virtual world to support the development of the vision of schome, informed by current understandings about learning, pedagogy and the ‘tools’ available to us today. This paper provides an overview of the first three phases of the SPP and briefly outlines the research methodologies used within it. This leads into a discussion of the potential of virtual worlds to support pedagogical exploration, which in turn leads to consideration of three dimensions of practice that emerged from the SPP. These three dimensions, which correspond closely with a framework developed in post-compulsory education, are illustrated by use of descriptions of activities and other data from the SPP. The paper concludes by raising questions about the extent to which pedagogical practices will change in the future as a result of the opportunities offered by virtual worlds.

  • Uexküll, Jakob von, and Uexküll, Jakob von. 2010. A Foray Into The Worlds Of Animals And Humans: With A Theory Of Meaning. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
  • VARELA, Francisco J. “La Réduction Phénoménologique À L'écoute De L'expérience : Réponse À François-David Sebbah” (no date): 9.
  • Varela, Francisco J. 2004. “La Réduction Phénoménologique À L'écoute De L'expérience : Réponse À François-David Sebbah”. Intellectic 2 (39): 189-197.

  • Varela, Francisco J. 1999. Ethical Know-How: Action, Wisdom, And Cognition. 1 editionst ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
    Abstract: How can science be brought to connect with experience? This book addresses two of the most challenging problems facing contemporary neurobiology and cognitive science: first, understanding how we unconsciously execute habitual actions as a result of neurological and cognitive processes that are not formal actions of conscious judgment but part of a habitual nexus of systematic self-organization; second, creating an ethics adequate to our present awareness that there is no such thing as a transcendental self, a stable subject, or a soul. In earlier modes of cognitive science, cognition was conceptualized according to a model of representation and abstract reasoning. In the realm of ethics, this corresponded to the philosophical tenet that to do what is ethical is to do what corresponds to an abstract set of rules. By contrast to this computationalism, the author places central emphasis on what he terms "enaction"―cognition as the ability to negotiate embodied, everyday living in a world that is inseparable from our sensory-motor capacities. Apart from his researches in cognitive science, the bodies of thought that enable Varela to make this link are phenomenology and two representatives of what he calls the "wisdom traditions": Confucian ethics and Buddhist epistemology. From the Confucian tradition, he draws upon the Mencius to propose an ethics of praxis, one in which ethical action is conceived as a project of being rather than as a system of judgment, less a matter of rules that are universally applicable than a goal of expertise, sagehood. The Buddhist contribution to his project encompasses "the embodiment of the void" and the "pragmatics of a virtual self." How does a belief system that does not posit a unitary self or subject conceive the living of an "I"? In summation, the author proposes an ethics founded on "savoir faire" that is a practice of transformation based on a constant recognition of the "virtual" nature of ourselves in the actual operations of our mental lives.


  • Varela, Francisco J. 1991. “Organism: A Meshwork Of Selfless Selves”. In Organism And The Origins Of Self, 79-107. Boston Studies In The Philosophy Of Science. Springer, Dordrecht. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-011-3406-4_5.
    Abstract: Organism connotes a knotty dialectic: a living system makes itself into a entity distinct from its environment through a process that brings forth, through that very process, a world proper to the organism.
  • Varela, Francisco J., Thompson, Evan T., and Rosch, Eleanor. 1991. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science And Human Experience. Revised ed. edition. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
    Abstract: The Embodied Mind provides a unique, sophisticated treatment of the spontaneous and reflective dimension of human experience. The authors argue that only by having a sense of common ground between mind in Science and mind in experience can our understanding of cognition be more complete. Toward that end, they develop a dialogue between cognitive science and Buddhist meditative psychology and situate it in relation to other traditions such as phenomenology and psychoanalysis.

  • Varela, Francisco J., Thompson, Evan, and Rosch, Eleanor. 1999. L'inscription Corporelle De L'esprit. Trans. Véronique Havelange. Paris: Seuil.

  • Villalobos, M., and Ward, D. 2016. “Lived Experience And Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’S Jonasian Turn”. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2): 204-212. https://constructivist.info/11/2/204.villalobos.
    Abstract: An international peer-reviewed e-journal focussing on the multidisciplinary study of the philosophical and scientific foundations and applications of constructivist appraoches

  • Vion-Dury, Jean. 2016. “The Musical Homunculus, Or The Content Of Pry-Reflexive Consciousness Contents In Music Listening”. Chroniques Phénoménologiques 3-4 (December): 40-51. https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01738640.
    Tags: Conscience, Ecoute musicale, Vécus pré réflexifs.

  • Visetti, Yves-Marie, and Rosenthal, Victor. 2006. “Les Contingences Sensorimotrices De L'enaction”. Intellectica - La Revue De L'association Pour La Recherche Sur Les Sciences De La Cognition (Arco) 43 (1) (November): 105-116. https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00120723.
    Tags: action, anticipation, contingence sensorimotrice, corps propre, émergence, empiricism, empirisme, externalism, externalisme, form, forme, internalism, internalisme, lived body, meaning, microgenèse, microgenesis, organisation, organization, savoir-faire, sens, sensorimotor contingencies, skill.

  • Von Uexküll, Jacob. 2004. Mondes Animaux Et Monde Humain Suivi De Théorie De La Signification. Pocket Agora. Paris: Pocket.


  • Weber, Andreas, and Varela, Francisco J. 2002. “Life After Kant: Natural Purposes And The Autopoietic Foundations Of Biological Individuality”. Phenomenology And The Cognitive Sciences 1 (2) (June 1): 97-125. doi:10.1023/A:1020368120174. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1020368120174.
    Abstract: This paper proposes a basic revision of the understanding of teleology in biological sciences. Since Kant, it has become customary to view purposiveness in organisms as a bias added by the observer; the recent notion of teleonomy expresses well this “as-if” character of natural purposes. In recent developments in science, however, notions such as self-organization (or complex systems) and the autopoiesis viewpoint, have displaced emergence and circular self-production as central features of life. Contrary to an often superficial reading, Kant gives a multi-faceted account of the living, and anticipates this modern reading of the organism, even introducing the term “self-organization” for the first time. Our re-reading of Kant in this light is strengthened by a group of philosophers of biology, with Hans Jonas as the central figure, who put back on center stage an organism-centered view of the living, an autonomous center of concern capable of providing an interior perspective. Thus, what is present in nuce in Kant, finds a convergent development from this current of philosophy of biology and the scientific ideas around autopoeisis, two independent but parallel developments culminating in the 1970s. Instead of viewing meaning or value as artifacts or illusions, both agree on a new understanding of a form of immanent teleology as truly biological features, inevitably intertwined with the self-establishment of an identity which is the living process.

  • Wilson, Robert A., and Foglia, Lucia. 2017. “Embodied Cognition”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy, eds. Edward N. Zalta. Spring 2017th ed. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/embodied-cognition/.
    Abstract: Cognition is embodied when it is deeply dependent upon features ofthe physical body of an agent, that is, when aspects of theagent's body beyond the brain play a significant causal orphysically constitutive role in cognitive processing., In general, dominant views in the philosophy of mind and cognitivescience have considered the body as peripheral to understanding thenature of mind and cognition. Proponents of embodied cognitive scienceview this as a serious mistake. Sometimes the nature of the dependenceof cognition on the body is quite unexpected, and suggests new ways ofconceptualizing and exploring the mechanics of cognitiveprocessing., Embodied cognitive science encompasses a loose-knit family ofresearch programs in the cognitive sciences that often share acommitment to critiquing and even replacing traditional approaches tocognition and cognitive processing. Empirical research on embodiedcognition has exploded in the past 10 years. As the bibliography forthis article attests, the various bodies of work that will be discussedrepresent a serious alternative to the investigation of cognitivephenomena., Relatively recent work on the embodiment of cognition provides muchfood for thought for empirically-informed philosophers of mind. This isin part because of the rich range of phenomena that embodied cognitivescience has studied. But it is also in part because those phenomena areoften thought to challenge dominant views of the mind, such as thecomputational and representational theories of mind, at the heart oftraditional cognitive science. And they have sometimes been taken toundermine standard positions in the philosophy of mind, such as theidea that the mind is identical to, or even realized in, the brain.
    Tags: agency, cognitive science, mental representation, mind: computational theory of, mind: modularity of, moral psychology: empirical approaches.

  • Zahavi, Dan. 1999. Self-Awareness And Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation. 1 editionst ed. Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press.
    Abstract: Winner of 2000 Edward Goodwin Ballard Prize In the rigorous and highly original Self-Awareness and Alterity, Dan Zahavi provides a sustained argument that phenomenology, especially in its Husserlian version, can contribute something decisive to the analysis of self-awareness. Taking on recent discussions within both analytical philosophy (Shoemaker, Castaneda, Nagel) and contemporary German philosophy (Henrich, Frank, Tugendhat), Zahavi argues that the phenomenological tradition has much more to offer when it comes to the problem of self-awareness than is normally assumed. As a contribution to the current philosophical debate concerning self-awareness, the book presents a comprehensive reconstruction of Husserl's theory of pre-reflective self-awareness, thereby criticizing a number of prevalent interpretations and a systematic discussion of a number of phenomenological insights related to this issue, including analyses of the temporal, intentional, reflexive, bodily, and social nature of the self.

  • Zahavi, Dan. 2014. Self And Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, And Shame. Oxford: OUP Oxford.
    Abstract: Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? How do we at all come to understand others? Does empathy amount to and allow for a distinct experiential acquaintance with others, and if so, what does that tell us about the nature of selfhood and social cognition? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter? Engaging with debates and findings in classical phenomenology, in philosophy of mind and in various empirical disciplines, Dan Zahavi's new book Self and Other offers answers to these questions. Discussing such diverse topics as self-consciousness, phenomenal externalism, mindless coping, mirror self-recognition, autism, theory of mind, embodied simulation, joint attention, shame, time-consciousness, embodiment, narrativity, self-disorders, expressivity and Buddhist no-self accounts, Zahavi argues that any theory of consciousness that wishes to take the subjective dimension of our experiential life serious must endorse a minimalist notion of self. At the same time, however, he also contends that an adequate account of the self has to recognize its multifaceted character, and that various complementary accounts must be integrated, if we are to do justice to its complexity. Thus, while arguing that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed and not constitutively dependent upon others, Zahavi also acknowledges that there are dimensions of the self and types of self-experience that are other-mediated. The final part of the book exemplifies this claim through a close analysis of shame.

  • Zahavi, Dan. 2014. “Empathy And Other-Directed Intentionality”. Topoi 33 (April 1). doi:10.1007/s11245-013-9197-4.
    Abstract: The article explores and compares the accounts of empathy found in Lipps, Scheler, Stein and Husserl and argues that the three latter phenomenological thinkers offer a model of empathy, which is not only distinctly different from Lipps’, but which also diverge from the currently dominant models.
    Attachment Full Text PDF 543.6 kb (source)
  • Zahavi, Dan. 2015. “You, Me, And We: The Sharing Of Emotional Experiences”. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 22 (January 1).
    Abstract: When surveying recent philosophical work on the nature and status of collective intentionality and we-intentions, it is striking how much effort is spent on analysing the structure of joint action and on establishing whether or not the intention to, say, go for a walk or paint a house together is reducible to some form of I-intentionality. Much less work has been devoted to an analysis of shared affects and emotions. This is regrettable, not only because emotional sharing in all likelihood is developmentally prior to and logically more basic than joint action, but also because it might constitute a way of being together with others, which we need to study if we wish to better understand the nature of the we. In the present contribution, my primary aim will be to offer an answer to the following question: does the we-experience, the experience of being part of a we, presuppose, precede, preserve, or abolish the difference between self- and other-experience? In pursuing this task, I will take a closer look at emotional sharing and draw on resources that are too frequently ignored in current social ontology, namely insights found in classical phenomenology and in contemporary research on social cognition.
    Attachment Full Text PDF 507.9 kb (source)

  • Zask, Joëlle. 2011. Participer : Essai Sur Les Formes Démocratiques De La Participation. Lormont: Editions Le Bord de l'eau.
    Abstract: Que signifie, que sous-entend, qu'engage, la participation ? En art, en politique, à l'école, dans l'entreprise, dans la presse et sur le web, une même injonction est aujourd'hui adressée à chacun d'entre nous : participez ! Oui, mais à quoi, comment et pour quoi faire ? Sait-on ce que participer veut dire ? Rien n'est moins certain. Cet essai propose d'explorer l'idée de participation afin de mettre au jour les critères permettant de faire la part entre ses formes superficielles, fallacieuses, manipulatrices ou simplement plébiscitaires - elles sont légion -, et celles qui s'avèrent au contraire réellement constructives aussi bien pour chaque individu que pour le groupe. A partir d'exemples empruntés à toutes sortes d'activités - jouer aux cartes, voter, apprécier une oeuvre d'art, discuter, organiser une randonnée, chercher à être reconnu -, il s'agit de montrer que la participation bien comprise s'identifie à cette subtile articulation entre prendre part, apporter une part (contribuer) et recevoir une part (bénéficier). Bref, à l'idéal démocratique lui-même. Cet ouvrage, au croisement de la philosophie, de la sociologie, de la science politique et de l'esthétique, s'adresse à tous ceux pour qui la participation n'est pas un mot creux, mais définit la qualité même des relations interhumaines dans un monde résolument ouvert à l'expérience démocratique.

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