Bibliography


  • Ihde, Don. 1990. Technology And The Lifeworld: From Garden To Earth. Indiana University Press.
    Mots-clés : Technology & Engineering / General, Technology & Engineering / Social Aspects.


  • Irvin, Sherri. 2005. « Interprétation Et Description D’Une Oeuvre D’Art ». Philosophiques 32 (1): 135-148. doi:https://doi.org/10.7202/011067ar. http://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/philoso/2005-v32-n1-philoso887/011067ar/.
    Résumé : Selon Arthur Danto, il est illégitime de chercher une description « neutre » ou préinterprétative d’une oeuvre d’art, parce qu’une telle description ne peut respecter l’oeuvre d’art en tant que telle. Nous ne pouvons aborder une oeuvre sans l’interpréter, puisque l’interprétation constitue l’oeuvre d’art et distingue celle-ci d’un simple objet physique. Dans cet article je soutiens que, bien que Danto ait raison de vouloir distinguer les oeuvres d’art des simples choses, on peut effectuer cette distinction sans conclure que les oeuvres d’art sont constituées par l’interprétation. Je soutiens en outre que le point de vue de Danto ne nous permet pas de tenir compte du fait que les interprétations doivent respecter les caractéristiques de l’oeuvre. Je montre qu’en faisant appel aux conventions de description spécifiques à l’art, on peut proposer une description neutre qui respecte l’oeuvre d’art en tant qu’oeuvre. Mon point de vue est conforme à la relation généralement admise entre la description et l’interprétation des oeuvres d’art, et évite les conséquences négatives de la théorie de Danto.
    Pièce jointe Full Text PDF 155.7 ko (source)

  • Janicaud, Dominique. 1991. Le Tournant Théologique De La Phénoménologie Française. Combas: L'Eclat.


  • Jonas, Hans. 1992. « The Burden And Blessing Of Mortality ». The Hastings Center Report 22 (1): 34-40. doi:10.2307/3562722. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3562722.

  • Jonas, Hans. 2000. Le Phénomène De La Vie. Vers Une Biologie Philosophique. Bruxelles; Paris: De Boeck - Wesmael.

  • Jonas, Hans. 2001. The Phenomenon Of Life: Toward A Philosophical Biology. 1 editionᵉʳ éd. Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press.
    Résumé : A classic of phenomenology and existentialism, The Phenomenon of Life sets forth a systematic and comprehensive philosophy--an existential interpretation of biological facts laid out in support of his claim that the mind is prefigured throughout organic existence. Hans Jonas shows how life-forms present themselves on an ascending scale of perception and freedom of action, a scale reaching its apex in a human being's capacity for thought and morally responsible behavior.

  • Kock, Ned. 2009. Virtual Team Leadership And Collaborative Engineering Advancements: Contemporary Issues And Implications: Contemporary Issues And Implications. IGI Global.
    Résumé : Virtual team leadership and collaborative engineering bring teams, product engineering, and processes into the 21st century through the use of e-collaboration technologies. These powerful tools accomplish work efficiently and effectively, whether communication takes place only through e-collaboration technologies or in combination with face-to-face interaction.Virtual Team Leadership and Collaborative Engineering Advancements: Contemporary Issues and Implications addresses a range of e-collaboration topics, with emphasis on two particularly challenging ones: virtual team leadership and collaborative engineering. With contributing authors among the most accomplished e-collaboration, virtual team leadership, and collaborative engineering researchers in the world today, this book presents a blend of conceptual, theoretical, and applied chapters creating a publication that will serve both academics and practitioners.
    Mots-clés : Computers / Data Transmission Systems / Wireless, Computers / Information Technology, Computers / Networking / General.

  • Kyselo, Miriam. 2016. « Kyselo, M. (2016). The Minimal Self Needs A Social Update. Philosophical Psychology, Http://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1214251 ». https://www.academia.edu/27780216/Kyselo_M._2016_._The_minimal_self_needs_a_social_update._Philosophical_Psychology_http_doi.org_10.1080_09515089.2016.1214251.
    Résumé : Review Essay Self and other: Exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame, by Dan Zahavi, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015.


  • Kyselo, Miriam. 2014. « The Body Social: An Enactive Approach To The Self ». Frontiers In Psychology 5. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986/full.
    Résumé : This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on Jonas’ notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator.
    Mots-clés : body-social problem, distinction and participation, embodied self, enactive self, social body, Social identity, social self.
    Pièce jointe Full Text PDF 635 ko (source)


  • Kyselo, Miriam. 2014. « The Body Social: An Enactive Approach To The Self ». Frontiers In Psychology 5. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986/full.
    Résumé : This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on Jonas’ notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator.
    Mots-clés : body-social problem, distinction and participation, embodied self, enactive self, social body, Social identity, social self.
    Pièce jointe Full Text PDF 635 ko (source)


  • Køster, Allan. 2020. « The Felt Sense Of The Other: Contours Of A Sensorium ». Phenomenology And The Cognitive Sciences (janvier 22). doi:10.1007/s11097-020-09657-3. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09657-3.
    Résumé : In this paper, I explore the phenomenon of a felt sense of the concrete other. Although the importance of this phenomenon is recognised in the contemporary discussion on intercorporeality, it has not been subjected to systematic phenomenological analysis. I argue that the felt sense of the other is an aspect of intercorporeal body memory in so far as it is a habituation to something like the concrete other’s expressive style. Because it is inherently a sensory phenomenon, I speak of an embodied sensorium of the other. I illustrate the phenomenon through contrasting case-vignettes taken from research in early parental bereavement. Based on this, I identify five modalities that outline the fundamental contours of a sensorium and specify that in their intermodal and synesthetic concretion they account for the felt sense of the other. Finally, I argue that the existential importance of the phenomenon is rooted in the distributed nature of my sense of self and self-familiarity. To illustrate this, I draw parallels between the felt sense of the concrete other and the felt sense of home and suggest that though there are also distinct differences between the two phenomena, they are rooted in the same underlying existential need for feeling-at-home in the world.
    Mots-clés : Bereavement, Body memory, Embodiment, Expressive style, Grief, Intercorporeality, Sense of self, Sensorium.

  • Lakoff, George, et Johnson, Mark. 1999. Philosophy In The Flesh: The Embodied Mind & Its Challenge To Western Thought. New York, NY: Basic Books.
    Résumé : What are human beings like? How is knowledge possible? What is truth? Where do moral values come from? Questions like these have stood at the center of Western philosophy for centuries. In addressing them, philosophers have made certain fundamental assumptions-that we can know our own minds by introspection, that most of our thinking about the world is literal, and that reason is disembodied and universal-that are now called into question by well-established results of cognitive science. It has been shown empirically that: Most thought is unconscious. We have no direct conscious access to the mechanisms of thought and language. Our ideas go by too quickly and at too deep a level for us to observe them in any simple way. Abstract concepts are mostly metaphorical. Much of the subject matter of philosophy, such as the nature of time, morality, causation, the mind, and the self, relies heavily on basic metaphors derived from bodily experience. What is literal in our reasoning about such concepts is minimal and conceptually impoverished. All the richness comes from metaphor. For instance, we have two mutually incompatible metaphors for time, both of which represent it as movement through space: in one it is a flow past us and in the other a spatial dimension we move along. Mind is embodied. Thought requires a body-not in the trivial sense that you need a physical brain to think with, but in the profound sense that the very structure of our thoughts comes from the nature of the body. Nearly all of our unconscious metaphors are based on common bodily experiences. Most of the central themes of the Western philosophical tradition are called into question by these findings. The Cartesian person, with a mind wholly separate from the body, does not exist. The Kantian person, capable of moral action according to the dictates of a universal reason, does not exist. The phenomenological person, capable of knowing his or her mind entirely through introspection alone, does not exist. The utilitarian person, the Chomskian person, the poststructuralist person, the computational person, and the person defined by analytic philosophy all do not exist. Then what does? Lakoff and Johnson show that a philosophy responsible to the science of mind offers radically new and detailed understandings of what a person is. After first describing the philosophical stance that must follow from taking cognitive science seriously, they re-examine the basic concepts of the mind, time, causation, morality, and the self: then they rethink a host of philosophical traditions, from the classical Greeks through Kantian morality through modern analytic philosophy. They reveal the metaphorical structure underlying each mode of thought and show how the metaphysics of each theory flows from its metaphors. Finally, they take on two major issues of twentieth-century philosophy: how we conceive rationality, and how we conceive language.


  • Lenay, Charles. 2008. « Médiations Techniques Des Interactions Perceptives: Rencontres Tactiles Dans Les Environnements Numériques Partagés ». Social Science Information 47 (3) (septembre 1): 331-352. doi:10.1177/0539018408092576. http://ssi.sagepub.com/content/47/3/331.
    Résumé : In what conditions does a technical mediation allow subjects to meet and to recognize each other? In digital networks, virtual spaces of collaborative work and play give rise to interactions at a distance between users. But to what extent do these interactions allow each partner to recognize the living presence of other perceiving subjects? In order to study this question, we use perceptual supplementation devices (more commonly known as sensory substitution systems). These devices for prosthetic perception represent an extreme situation, which is highly revealing as to the way that technological devices transform our perceptual capacities. Here, they make it possible to identify the conditions for the existence of perceptual crossing, i.e. a situation which makes it possible for two subjects to recognize each other. To carry out this research, we propose a minimalist experimental paradigm, constructed with the aid of the `Tactos' system. This perceptual supplementation device has been developed in order to give a tactile perception of digital forms present on the screen of a computer. When two such devices are connected in a network, they also allow tactile interactions between users at a distance (one can speak of distal caresses). The minimal version of this device gives scope for an experimental study and a precise analysis of the perceptual interactions. These experiments lead us to suggest several conditions which seem necessary for the constitution of a lived experience of perceptual crossing: the presence for each partner of a body-image perceivable by the other participants; a direct link between the perceptual activity and the dynamics of this body-image; and the impossibility for each partner to themselves perceive the body-image they present to the other participants.
    Mots-clés : Croisements perceptifs (Perceptual crossing), Environnements virtuels collaboratifs, Interactions perceptives, Substitution sensorielle, Suppléance perceptive.

  • Lenay, Charles. 2010. « “It’S So Touching”: Emotional Value In Distal Contact ». International Journal Of Design 4 (2): 15-25. http://www.ijdesign.org/ojs/index.php/IJDesign/article/view/694.
    Résumé : International Journal of Design, IJDesign, IJD, SCI, SSCI, A&HCI, How can interpersonal « contacts » allow for a « touching » relationship at a distance? To answer this question, we try to understand the reasons for the pre-eminence of the tactile modality in descriptions of emotional exchanges. With the help of an original experimental setup, we will propose a description of the essential conditions for “contact” mediated by technical devices. Next, in order to understand the relationship between such contact and emotional values, we will construe emotion as being the product of a force that instigates movement. We will then show that the “force” which is transmitted in touching contacts is based in the duality of the perceiving body and the body image. The fact that the subject is ignorant of his own body-image is revealed by the breaking of perceptual symmetry on the occasion of a touching encounter. These results provide some guiding principles for the design of interfaces and structures of interaction that allow for emotional contacts across networks.
    Mots-clés : A&HCI, IJD, IJDesign, International Journal of Design, SCI, SSCI.

  • Lenay, Charles. 2010. « «C’Est Très Touchant» La Valeur Émotionnelle Du Contact. ». Intellectica (53-54): 359–397. http://www.utc.fr/costech/v2/_upload/fichiers/publications/lenay_v4-ch-dif.doc.
  • Lenay, Charles. 1997. « Mouvement Et Perception : Médiation Technique Et Constitution De La Spatialisation ». Le Mouvement. Des Boucles Sensori-Motrices Aux Représentations Cognitives Et Langagières. Actes De La Sixième École D’Été De L’Association Pour La Recherche Cognitive: 69-80.
  • Lenay, Charles. 2006. « Énaction, Externalisme Et Suppléance Perceptive ». Intellectica 2006/1 (43): 27-52.


  • Lenay, Charles. 2006. « Enaction, Externalisme Et Suppléance Perceptive ». Intellectica 43 (1): 27-52. doi:10.3406/intel.2006.1326. https://www.persee.fr/doc/intel_0769-4113_2006_num_43_1_1326.
    Résumé : Pour défendre les thèses énactivistes et externalistes je propose une série d'expériences de perception prothétisée (suppléance perceptive) minimalistes. Ces situations expérimentales très simples permettent de dépasser la critique du représentationnalisme pour définir précisément, et faire fonctionner concrètement, le schème explicatif de la perception comme énaction. Localisation et reconnaissance de forme s'inscrivent dans l'espace des déplacements du point de vue relativement à l'objet perçu. L'espace de perception est l'espace d'action lui-même, et non pas un espace interne de représentation. C'est la position externaliste radicale pour laquelle l'activité cognitive et les contenus de l'expérience vécue sont à comprendre dans la dynamique sensorimotrice du couplage entre l'organisme et son environnement, et non pas comme computation de représentations internes. Cet externalisme semble être un bon cadre épistémologique et théorique pour rendre compte de l'efficacité de la cognition située. Les dispositifs et environnements techniques transforment nos possibilités d'action et donc notre expérience vécue en offrant de nouvelles capacités de perception, d'imagination, de mémorisation ou de raisonnement. De même un cadre externaliste permet un dialogue fructueux entre phénoménologie et psychophysiologie. Plutôt que de présupposer une séparation entre expérience vécue interne et objectivité externe et donc seulement chercher des corrélats neuronaux des états de conscience, pour l'externalisme cette séparation se constitue dans le cours même de l'activité concrète et donc l'espace de l'expérience vécue est co-extensif à l'espace d''action et de perception.
  • Lenay, Charles, et Sebbah, François. 2015. « La Constitution De L’Expérience D’Autrui : Approche Phénoménologique Et Expérimentale ». Les Cahiers Philosophiques De Strasbourg 38: 159-174.

  • Lenay, Charles, et Sebbah, François-David. 2001. « La Constitution De La Perception Spatiale. Approches Phénoménologique Et Expérimentale ». Intellectica 32 (1): 45–86. http://www.utc.fr/plateformephilo/ressources/Lenay_Sebbah_Constitution_spatiale_Intellectica.pdf.


  • Lenay, Charles, et Stewart, John. 2012. « Minimalist Approach To Perceptual Interactions ». Frontiers In Human Neuroscience 6: 98. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2012.00098. http://www.frontiersin.org/Human_Neuroscience/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00098/abstract.
    Résumé : Work aimed at studying social cognition in an interactionist perspective often encounters substantial theoretical and methodological difficulties: identifying the significant behavioral variables; recording them without disturbing the interaction; and distinguishing between: (a) the necessary and sufficient contributions of each individual partner for a collective dynamics to emerge; (b) features which derive from this collective dynamics and escape from the control of the individual partners; and (c) the phenomena arising from this collective dynamics which are subsequently appropriated and used by the partners. We propose a minimalist experimental paradigm as a basis for this conceptual discussion: by reducing the sensory inputs to a strict minimum, we force a spatial and temporal deployment of the perceptual activities, which makes it possible to obtain a complete recording and control of the dynamics of interaction. After presenting the principles of this minimalist approach to perception, we describe a series of experiments on two major questions in social cognition: recognizing the presence of another intentional subject; and phenomena of imitation. In both cases, we propose explanatory schema which render an interactionist approach to social cognition clear and explicit. Starting from our earlier work on perceptual crossing we present a new experiment on the mechanisms of reciprocal recognition of the perceptual intentionality of the other subject: the emergent collective dynamics of the perceptual crossing can be appropriated by each subject. We then present an experimental study of opaque imitation (when the subjects cannot see what they themselves are doing). This study makes it possible to characterize what a properly interactionist approach to imitation might be. In conclusion, we draw on these results, to show how an interactionist approach can contribute to a fully social approach to social cognition.
    Mots-clés : imitation, Interaction, minimalism, Perceptual crossing, recognition of intentionality.
    Pièce jointe Full Text PDF 2.6 Mo (source)
  • Lenay, Charles, Stewart, John, et Gapenne, Olivier. 2002. « Espace D'action Technique Et Geste Perceptif ». Le Geste Technique : Réflexions Méthodologiques Et Anthropologiques (Bril B. et Roux V. (Eds) Ramonville Saint-Agne, Editions Erès). Revue D'anthropologie Des Connaissances, Technologies /idéologies / Pratiques: 215-230.
  • Lenay, Charles, Thouvenin, Indira, Guenand, Anne, Stewart, John, et Maillet, Barthélémy. 2007. « Designing The Ground For Pleasurable Experience ». Designing Pleasurable Products And Interaces 5 (Helsinki, Finlande).

  • Leroi-Gourhan, André. 1993. Gesture And Speech. MIT Press.
    Résumé : AndrA(c) Leroi-Gourhan (1911-1986) was an anthropologist and paleontologist whose theoretical endeavors extended well beyond those realms to encompass the culture of the twentieth century and its most advanced developments. His bold and coherent revision of both analytic and archaeological methods revolutionized the study of prehistoric culture. His adoption of the structuralist method for the analysis of prehistoric art enabled a radical rethinking and clearer understanding of its nature, with resulting implications for the understanding of the art of our own times, and for a broad range of contemporary issues.Leroi-Gourhan was, for example, concerned with questions of communication, particularly the ways in which new techniques of communication reshape our understanding of language and writing. His work in this field has proved catalytic for the thinking of other major theorists, among them Jacques Derrida. Gesture and Speech combines in one volume Technics and Language and Memory and Rhythms, which are the cornerstones of Leroi-Gourhan's comprehensive theory of human behavior and cultural development.In Technics and Language, Leroi-Gourhan looks at prehistoric technology in relation to the development of cognitive and linguistic faculties, expanding on the cultural ramifications of erect posture, a short face, a free hand during locomotion, and possession of movable implements.Memory and Rhythms approaches its subject from the standpoints of sociology and aesthetics. Here Leroi-Gourhan addresses the problems of instinct and intelligence. He defines the relationship between aesthetic behavior, on the one hand, and species attitudes and the personalization of ethnic groups, on the other, and undertakes a sweeping aesthetic analysis from visceral perception to figurative art, including a discussion of the "language of forms" that makes figurative art an abstract expression of language.
    Mots-clés : Social Science / Anthropology / General.

  • Leroi-Gourhan, André. 1964. Le Geste Et La Parole, 1 : Technique Et Langage. Vol. tome 1. 2 vol. Paris: Albin Michel.

  • Leroi-Gourhan, André. 1964. Le Geste Et La Parole, 2 : La Mémoire Et Les Rythmes. Vol. tome 2. 2 vol. Paris: Albin Michel.

  • Leroi-Gourhan, André. 1945. Milieu Et Techniques. Paris: Albin Michel.

  • Leroi-Gourhan, André. 1943. L'homme Et La Matière. Paris: Albin Michel.


  • Lestel, Dominique. 1999. « Portrait De L’Animal Comme Sujet ». Revue De Synthèse 120 (1) (janvier 1): 139-164. doi:10.1007/BF03182082. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03182082.
    Résumé : De nombreux philosophes anglo-saxons de tradition analytique nient qu’un animal puisse penser, ou qu’on puisse accéder à sa subjectivité. Nous développons une réponse alternative. La légitimité d’une évaluation de l’intelligence de l’animal repose d’abord sur une familiarité acquise à son contact au cours d’une histoire partagée. Elle est propre à celui qui vit avec un animal mais aussi à l’expert qui a acquis une connaissance de l’animal à la suite d’une pratique professionnelle élaborée. C’est parce que nous interagissons avec l’animal comme s’il était un sujet que nous sommes prêts à lui accorder une intelligence susceptible de rendre intelligibles nos relations avec lui. L’intelligence d’un même animal n’est pas fixée une fois pour toutes. Elle est en partie dépendante des dispositifs humains dans lesquels elle se trouve impliquée. La question d’une véritable zoologie se pose, qui étudie l’intelligence du vivant dans la perspective des sciences sociales aussi bien que dans celle de la biologie.

  • Levinas, E. 1997. Hors Sujet. Paris: Livre de Poche.
    Résumé : « A la notion des droits de l'homme appartiennent désormais - inséparables et en nombre toujours croissant - toutes les règles légales qui conditionnent l'exercice effectif de ces droits. Voici, derrière les droits à la vie et à la sécurité, à la libre disposition de ses biens et à l'égalité de tous les hommes devant la loi, à la liberté de la pensée et de son expression, à l'éducation et à la participation au pouvoir politique -, tous les autres qui les prolongent ou les rendent concrètement possibles : les droits à la santé, au bonheur, au travail et au repos, à la demeure et à la libre circulation, etc. »E. L.Avec Hors sujet, Emmanuel Levinas revient et approfondit sa réflexion sur le noyau dur de sa philosophie : la relation à l'Autre. Méditation superbe qui entraîne vers l'analyse des Droits de l'homme et droits d'autrui, une approche singulière du Langage quotidien et de la rhétorique sans éloquence, ou encore de La Transcendance des mots. En chemin, le philosophe retrouve la trace de ceux auprès desquels il a fortifié sa propre pensée - Merleau-Ponty, Jankélévitch, Leiris, mais aussi Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig ou Jean Wahl. Une magistrale leçon de philosophie.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 1997. Difficult Freedom: Essays On Judaism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 1987. Time And The Other And Additional Essays. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.
  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 1988. « Heidegger, Gagarine, Et Nous ». Dans Difficile Liberté. rééd. Paris: Le Livre de Poche.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 2009. Oeuvres : Tome 1, Carnets De Captivité Suivi De Ecrits Sur La Captivité Et Notes Philosophiques Diverses. Paris: Grasset & Fasquelle.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 2007. Liberte Et Commandement. Paris: Livre de Poche.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 2006. Altérité Et Transcendance. Paris: Le Livre de Poche.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 2004. Le Temps Et L'autre. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 2002. En Découvrant L'existence Avec Husserl Et Heidegger. Paris: Vrin.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 2002. De L'existence À L'existant. 2e éd.ᵉ éd. Paris: Vrin.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 1995. Dieu, La Mort Et Le Temps. Paris: Livre de Poche.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 1991. Entre Nous : Essais Sur Le Penser-À-L'autre. Paris: Grasset.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 1990. Totalité Et Infini : Essai Sur L'extériorité. Bib.essais. Paris: Livre de Poche.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 1984. Ethique Et Infini. Bib.essais. Paris: Livre de Poche.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 1990. Autrement Qu'être Ou Au-Delà De L'essence. Paris: Librairie générale française.
  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 1988. « Nom D'un Chien Ou Le Droit Naturel ». Dans Difficile Liberté. Le livre de poche. Paris.
  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 1948. « La Réalité Et Son Ombre ». Les Temps Modernres (38) (novembre): 771-789.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 2000. Théorie De L'intuition Dans La Phénoménologie De Husserl. Paris: Librairie Philosophique Vrin.

  • Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1990. Difficult Freedom: Essays On Judaism. Johns Hopkins University Press.
    Résumé : Jean Paul Sartre hailed him as the philosopher who introduced France to Husserl and Heidegger. Derrida has paid him homage as "master." An original philosopher who combines the insights of phenomenological analysis with those of Jewish spirituality, Emmanuel Levinas has proven to be of extraordinary importance in the history of modern thought. Collecting Levinas's important writings on religion, Difficult Freedom contributes to a growing debate about the significance of religion -- particularly Judaism and Jewish spiritualism -- in European philosophy. Topics include ethics, aesthetics, politics, messianism, Judaism and women, and Jewish-Christian relations, as well as the work of Spinoza, Hegel, Heidegger, Franz Rosenzweig, Simone Weil, and Jules Issac.
    Mots-clés : Religion / Judaism / General.

  • Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1994. Outside The Subject. Stanford University Press.
    Résumé : This volume consists of fourteen pieces selected by Levinas himself in 1987 from a large body of uncollected essays.
    Mots-clés : History / Military / World War II, Philosophy / Eastern, Philosophy / History & Surveys / Modern.

  • Levinas, Emmanuel. 1990. Autrement Qu'être, Ou, Au-Delà De L'essence. Paris: Livre de Poche.
    Résumé : « Dans ce livre je parle de la responsabilité comme de la structure essentielle, première, fondamentale de la subjectivité. Car c’est en termes éthiques que je décris la subjectivité. L’éthique, ici, ne vient pas en supplément à une base existentielle préalable ; c’est dans l’éthique entendue comme responsabilité que se noue le nœud même du subjectif. [...] L’humanité dans l’être historique et objectif, la percée même du subjectif, du psychisme humain, dans son originelle vigilance ou dégrisement, c’est l’être qui se défait de sa condition d’être : le dés-intéressement. C’est ce que veut dire le titre du livre : Autrement qu’être. […] Etre humain, cela signifie : vivre comme si l’on n’était pas un être parmi les êtres. »

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